Development & Humanitarian Assistance - Ukraine Oversight

Development & Humanitarian Assistance - Ukraine Oversight is sponsored by U.S. Department of State / USAID. This encompasses a wide range of development and humanitarian programs to support the Ukrainian government and people. Areas of focus include meeting lifesaving humanitarian needs, energy needs, supporting the prosecution of war crimes and human rights, and security.

Ensuring Oversight to U.S. Aid to Ukraine Ensuring Oversight to U.S. Aid to Ukraine Photo: Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images The unprecedented level of humanitarian, economic, and military aid that the United States has provided to Ukraine since Russia’s illegal invasion in February 2022 has been instrumental in Ukraine’s military resistance against Russia, and it has allowed the Ukrainian government to pay pensions and teacher salaries, support its healthcare system, and perform other activities to ensure that the government continues to function.

A Breakdown of U.S. Assistance to Ukraine The United States has provided billions in funding for Ukraine since the start of the war. The four supplemental aid packages passed by Congress to support Ukraine since the war began totals over $113. 4 billion .

Appropriated in these packages is $62. 3 billion for the Department of Defense, $46. 1 billion for the Department of State and USAID, and $5 billion for other government agencies.

The fourth package, which provided $48 billion , was approved in December 2022 by Congress. The amount was meant to cover Ukraine’s needs through the end of this fiscal year, though there are some concerns that this will not be enough, and the Biden administration does not plan to ask for additional funds until the next fiscal year.

U.S. Assistance to Ukraine and Oversight Strong oversight of U.S. assistance to Ukraine is important to ensure the continued support of Congress and the American people. It is important for Ukraine and the Biden administration to show clearly where the assistance is going and the impact that this assistance is having on the war. These are tasks that the OIGs at the DOD, State Department, and USAID are well equipped to handle.

This is particularly true of economic and humanitarian assistance, which are two categories that have more difficulty showing clear, tangible outcomes. Security assistance—largely in the form of weapons and other military equipment—is having a clear and visible impact on the war.

The DOD also has strong safeguards in place that allow it to easily track the flow of weapons, ammunition, and other equipment from point of delivery to Ukraine until they find their way into the field. Critical to U.S. support for Ukraine is the provision of the $22. 9 billion direct budget support to the Ukrainian government.

Since the war began, the Ukrainian government has experienced a significant monthly shortfall in tax and other government revenues. Ukraine’s choices for additional funding are limited. In August 2022, Ukraine’s international debt holders agreed to a suspension of debt payments, but this effectively locks Ukraine out of global debt markets.

The government could turn to local debt markets, but the interest rates charged are significantly higher than they were prewar. Budget support from Ukraine’s partners has helped to close its monthly deficit. This has been provided through prewar World Bank funding mechanisms as well as the creation of new trust funds including the Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund (URTF).

The money is dispersed in monthly tranches to the Ukrainian Ministry of Finance, which then allocates this money among ministries to meet the government’s obligations. The Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Ukraine Response (JSOP-Ukraine Response) is a compilation of the current collaboration between the three OIGs to ensure oversight of U.S. aid to Ukraine.

The FY 2023 plan is the first annual joint oversight plan submitted to Congress. Encompassing an all-of-government approach, the report summarizes and categorizes the work already being done by the OIGs.

The JSOP-Ukraine Response divides oversight into three main strategic oversight areas (SOAs): Security assistance and coordination : Jointly managed by the DOD and the State Department, this SOA includes encouraging anti-corruption programs, ensuring end-use monitoring, and providing advice to partner security forces, among other oversight mechanisms.

Non-security assistance and coordination : Jointly managed by the State Department and USAID, this SOA focuses on the non-security assistance that the United States has provided Ukraine, including economic and humanitarian aid. Management and operations : Jointly managed by the three OIGs, this SOA focuses on ensuring the security of U.S. personnel, administering U.S. government programs, and managing U.S. government contracts.

The JSOP-Ukraine Response report outlines 64 current or planned oversight projects and 14 completed projects. Current mechanisms in place include the joint hotline operated by the three OIGs. This hotline is confidential, open to the public, and a reliable way to report allegations of fraud, mismanagement, and abuse.

Additional oversight mechanisms include a mix of classified and unclassified audits and investigations into various government programs. In response to questions about the effectiveness of U.S. assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan and the volume of assistance, Congress created two special inspectors general to provide additional oversight.

Created in 2008, the SIGAR, as an independent body, did identify several issue areas with U.S. assistance to Afghanistan, including fraud and a lack of a comprehensive recovery strategy; it also criticized aid agencies for not taking enough risk. This duality arguably created a chilling effect on the willingness of USAID and its implementing partners to do more in Afghanistan.

From a strategic perspective, there is a debate over whether SIGAR helped or hurt the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and it is ultimately unclear if the work of SIGAR altered the outcome of the war. SIGAR continues its work to this day, despite Kabul falling to the Taliban nearly two years ago.

Following the 2013–14 Revolution of Dignity, Ukraine established considerable anti-corruption reforms that work toward the advancement of good governance, transparency, and accountability; however, the country continues to be weighed down by perceptions of corruption, which remains a concern for Ukraine’s partners. The calls for a SIGUA ignore this progress.

Since 2014, the Ukrainian government has managed significant support from a wide range of international donors. To date, there have been no allegations of corruption associated with this support. Moreover, the country has a vibrant civil society that has provided an important source of independent transparency and accountability for government.

The calls for oversight to U.S. aid to Ukraine are justified and will ensure the continued support from the U.S. Congress and the American people. However, the mechanisms put in place by the three OIGs at the U.S. DOD, the U.S. Department of State, and USAID already provide the necessary oversight and accountability.

Rather than repeat the approach taken in Afghanistan and Iraq, Congress and the Biden administration should learn from the analysis produced by SIGAR and SIGIR and apply those lessons. It is understandable that Congress feels the need to act to ensure that U.S. aid to Ukraine is distributed securely, fairly, and appropriately. But this action does not need to take the form of a SIGUR.

Instead, the U.S. government could take the following measures to assist in the oversight and monitoring of aid provided to the Ukrainian government: Grant flexible hiring authority to the current OIGs in order to ensure timely and efficient appointments. Increase the cap on the number of personnel at the U.S. embassy in Kyiv and allow establishment of permanent slots for OIGs, rather than relying on temporary duty assignments.

Daniel F. Runde is senior vice president, William A. Schreyer Chair, and director of the Project on Prosperity and Development at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.

C. Madeleine McLean is a research assistant with the CSIS Project on Prosperity and Development. Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues.

Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

Senior Adviser (Non-resident), Office of the President Former Program Manager and Research Associate, Sustainable Development and Resilience Initiative and Project on Prosperity and Development Project on Prosperity and Development