DOS Preventing U.S. Adversaries' Access to Critical Technologies and Exploitation of Scientific and Commercial Facilities for Military Advancement (DFOP0017248)

DOS Preventing U.S. Adversaries' Access to Critical Technologies and Exploitation of Scientific and Commercial Facilities for Military Advancement (DFOP0017248) is sponsored by U.S. Department of State (DOS). Supports efforts to prevent U. S.

adversaries from accessing critical technologies and exploiting scientific and commercial facilities for military advancement.

DOS Preventing U.S. Adversaries’ Access to Critical Technologies and Exploitation of Scientific and Commercial Facilities for Military Advancement (DFOP0017248) - Research Support Notice: this is an archived listing << Back to Limited Submissions DOS Preventing U.S. Adversaries’ Access to Critical Technologies and Exploitation of Scientific and Commercial Facilities for Military Advancement (DFOP0017248) Funding Agency: United States Department of State (DOS) Funding Type: Research: Project Grants & Innovation Opportunity ID: DFOP0017248 Submission Limit per Institution: 1 Sponsor/Solicitation URL: Visit Sponsor Website Questions concerning the limited submissions process may be submitted to limitedsubs@psu.

edu . NOTICE: This opportunity is currently OPEN and will be filled on a first-come, first-served basis. Interested parties are encouraged to respond promptly to secure participation.

U.S. adversaries, including China, are seeking advanced and emerging technologies to advance their military capabilities and to develop and deploy weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced conventional weapons against the United States.

A significant number of foreign governments, public and private research organizations, tech industries, and start-up communities are unaware of dual-use applications of technologies and remain vulnerable to theft and loss of technologies, data, intellectual property (IP), knowledge and talent that can be leveraged for military end uses.

For example, semiconductors, which are critical components in a most of today’s electronic devices, are also a critical input for the development of military technologies, WMD and WMD delivery systems, and technologies with potential dual-uses – such as artificial intelligence.

In addition to seeking advanced technologies, adversaries exploit commercial and scientific facilities, training centers, and the seas to conduct illegal military operations.

Malign actors use legal and illegal means such as joint commercial ventures, talent recruitment programs, research partnerships/funding, predatory contracting agreements, private equity investments, joint scientific facilities/laboratories, cybertheft, state-sponsored industrial espionage, supply chain diversion, or sales or donation of untrusted hardware and software to acquire foreign intellectual property, conduct dual-use research and development, or conduct military activities under the guise of science diplomacy or commercial activity.

Affiliations and links to military entities are often obfuscated or disguised when establishing collaborations and partnerships in order to gain admission and secure visas to study or conduct research on sensitive advanced and emerging technologies at foreign universities; to procure critical equipment and components from unsuspecting or indiscriminate commercial or scientific institutions; or when establishing joint scientific facilities or operating in international business markets.

ISN/CTR seeks to enable key foreign partners to protect critical advanced and emerging technologies from exploitation by our adversaries for military, technological, and economic advancement; secure U.S. intellectual property (IP) abroad; and prevent the exploitation of commercial and scientific partnerships in several key areas, including but not limited to: aerospace and space technologies, artificial intelligence (AI), nanotechnologies, neuroscience, quantum computing and sensing, semiconductors, and smart cities.

ISN/CTR also seeks to apply risk reduction tools to more traditional security vulnerabilities that are exploited by proliferator states for military training, geographic influence, etc. ISN/CTR seeks proposals to advance the National Security Presidential Memorandum -3, America First Investment Policy by stopping Chinese firms and researchers from stealing U.S. intellectual property and sensitive technologies to enable the Chinese Communist Party and the People’s Liberation Army from developing and deploying dual-use technologies, WMDs, advanced conventional weapons, and conducting malicious cyberattacks that threaten U.S. security.

Proposed projects should include, but are not limited to, trainings, tools, mentorship, and risk assessments for governments, academia, and private industry that prevent or slow military advancement that is being pursued through the exploitation of the international scientific enterprise, global technology supply chain, and commercial ventures.

For all proposed activities, applicants will be expected to use grant funds to pay for event logistics, catering, translation and interpretation, and costs related to travel for participants (with the exception of high-income foreign partners) and subject matter experts.

Possible activities include, but are not limited to: Raise awareness in tech and research communities of dual-use applications of technologies and promote adoption of security measures to block adversary acquisition of technology.

Plan and organize sectoral and cross-sectoral trainings, workshops, and roundtables for government policymakers, university administrators, researchers, tech companies, startups, and entrepreneurs in key ISN/CTR partner countries to increase awareness of dual-use applications of advanced and emerging technologies, identify methods used by malign actors to acquire such technology, data, and intellectual property, and implement technology protection measures to block adversary acquisition attempts.

Intended outcomes include: increased awareness of licit and illicit methods employed by China and other U.S. adversaries to acquire critical technologies and adoption of technology security practices in key partner countries to prevent these activities. Establish or improve national and institutional level research security and integrity policies and practices prevent exploitation of international research collaborations.

Plan and organize trainings, workshops, roundtables, fellowships, study tours, and grant programs for government policymakers, university administrators, technology transfer officers, academic legal counsels, admissions officers, researchers, and students to develop national and institutional level research security strategies, policies, and frameworks to strengthen the ability of higher education institutions to institute student, scholar, and faculty vetting programs, identify predatory talent programs and scientific conferences, and conduct due-diligence on foreign research collaboration proposals to safeguard valuable and sensitive research, data, and intellectual property.

Support, expand, and leverage the ISN/CTR-established regional research security consortiums and local champions to further these efforts. Develop and share risk assessment, due diligence, and planning tools for institutional level research security and technology with ISN/CTR partner countries.

Plan and organize engagements to help priority institutions establish dedicated oversight offices to ensure continuous monitoring and regular security audits. Plan and organize trainings for academic and private sector stakeholders to identify predatory contracting language and unfair IP rights that force technology transfer during international collaborations and agreements.

Intended outcomes include: robust research security and IP protection measures in place in countries with cutting-edge research to protect technology needed by adversaries to overcome domestic R&D hurdles; establishment of trusted international research partners to advance U.S. science and technology priorities; protection of U.S. intellectual property.

Enhance institutional data security measures to mitigate cybersecurity vulnerabilities and block cybertheft of dual-use data and IP. Plan and organize trainings, risk assessments or other types of projects to secure critical and sensitive technological information and intellectual capital and IP at foreign institutions (academic and private industry) targeted by malign actors.

Plan and organize trainings to mitigate both insider and outsider threats through robust personnel management, cybersecurity and information security practices, security enhancement grants, or hardware/software procurement. Provide cyber hygiene training to scientists, engineers, managers, and security officers in academic and private sector institutions.

Provide technical training to information technology and information security staff on incident detection, prevention, management and response. Conduct cyber security vulnerability assessments at tech companies and research institutions.

Intended outcomes include: robust cyber hygiene practices and secure data systems in place in countries with cutting-edge research to protect dual-use data and IP needed by adversaries to overcome domestic R&D hurdles; establishment of trusted international research partners to advance U.S. science and technology priorities; protection of U.S. intellectual property.

Improve physical security, personnel reliability, and due diligence best practices to secure technology supply chains to prevent diversion of dual-use technologies to U.S. adversaries.

Plan and organize trainings or workshops to enhance due-diligence efforts, know-your-customer practices, and develop tailored risk management practices for ISN/CTR partner country technology companies and foreign entities involved in financing, procuring, or distributing critical technology to secure technology supply chains.

Plan and organize trainings or workshops to train startups and technology companies to conduct due diligence on investors to prevent technology diversion and install user-level controls. Plan and organize trainings to strengthen personnel reliability at technology design, fabrication and manufacturing firms and engage security and human resources staff on insider threat mitigation and employee vetting.

Plan and organize trainings to strengthen physical security practices at technology firms and engage staff on threat vectors and vulnerability assessments.

Intended outcomes include: robust investor due-diligence, end-user-verification, physical security, and personnel reliability practices in place in countries with supply chain nodes, advanced manufacturing, unique know-how, and specialized equipment and tools to protect them from being diverted to adversaries seeking to indigenize critical supply chains; protect U.S. intellectual property present in global supply chains; and prevent specialized know-how from being acquired by our adversaries to overcome their domestic hurdles.

Enable foreign decisionmakers to identify and mitigate risks of military use of joint scientific facilities/laboratories, commercial entities, and non-trusted smart city vendors to conduct military and surveillance activities.

Plan and organize trainings, workshops, and other engagements to enable national, subnational, and institutional decisionmakers to identify risks and dual-use potential of joint research facilities, laboratories, and commercial entities located in their countries under the guise of scientific diplomacy and commercial ventures.

Plan and organize trainings to enable decisionmakers to identify and negotiate away from opaque and predatory language in agreements for scientific infrastructure, facilities, and laboratories being funded and built by adversarial countries that enable covert military activities to take place.

Plan and organize trainings to build cybersecurity capacity and enable ISN/CTR partner country national, city, and private industry stakeholders make risk informed decisions when adopting smart city technologies and to identify and deny not-trusted vendors.

Intended outcomes include: informed partners who are able to decline, cancel, or renegotiate contracts and agreements for joint scientific facilities and commercial entities in order to prevent covert military and surveillance activities from being conducted in these facilities or through connected networks and technology backdoors.

Provide tools and case studies to support key foreign partners to deny China access to sensitive technologies . Develop and disseminate country, audience, and tech sector specific case studies to demonstrate technology transfer threats to enable ISN/CTR partners to better understand risk and develop best practices.

Create tools that contribute to a research security toolkit for ISN/CTR partners as they strengthen research security practices, which could include AI/machine learning risk assessment tools, due diligence tools to reduce time needed to investigate linkages between research collaborators, investors, and institutions with military entities, tools to assist with developing institutional level technology control plans and dual-use screening, open-source platforms for reporting research and IP theft, or resources to help institutions respond to research security incidents.

Intended outcomes include: increased awareness and ability of countries with cutting-edge technology to deny access to U.S. adversaries and prevent exploitation of these technologies for military advancement and development of weapons that could be used against the United States. Prevent the development and use of AI by U.S. adversaries to strengthen their military, intelligence, and surveillance capabilities.

Engage countries leading in AI research and plan and organize trainings for government, industry and startups, and academic stakeholders to raise awareness of dual-uses of AI, which could include delivering security related modules during AI training programs, educating AI developers on risks of using untrusted foundational models, providing due diligence tools to evaluate investor military linkages and affiliations, and educating researchers to mitigate exploitation of their talent.

Plan and organize projects to leverage AI for nonproliferation applications. Plan and organize trainings to provide U.S. alternatives to AI training programs delivered by CCP linked entities.

Intended outcomes include: secure AI development measures in place in countries with cutting-edge research to block adversary attempts to acquire AI capabilities that threaten America’s safety; establishment of trusted international research partners to advance U.S. science and technology priorities; adoption of U.S. promoted AI standards.

Projects in these areas can be cross-sectoral or tailored to vulnerable technology communities in a specific partner country.

For example: Aerospace and space technology stakeholders in: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ethiopia, India, Kenya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Thailand, United Arab Emirates AI stakeholders in: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Finland, Germany, India, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Republic of Korea, Singapore, United Arab Emirates, Vietnam Neuroscience stakeholders in: Brazil, Chile, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, Singapore Quantum stakeholders in: Austria, Denmark, Germany, Finland, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, Sweden, Switzerland Semiconductor stakeholders in: Belgium, Germany, India, Ireland, Japan, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Switzerland, Taiwan This announcement provides only opportunity highlights.

Please carefully review the program guidelines and the sponsor's website for any requirements and expectations related to eligibility, PI and Co-PI limits, budget, collaboration, priority research areas, letter of intent requirements, and review criteria before submitting to this internal competition.