Libyan Civil Society Capacity Building for Reconciliation

Libyan Civil Society Capacity Building for Reconciliation is sponsored by United States Institute of Peace (USIP). This program aims to strengthen the capacity of Libyan civil society organizations to engage in conflict resolution and reconciliation efforts.

Civil Society Organizations and Peacebuilding in Libya: Reality and Challenges | Springer Nature Link Civil Society Organizations and Peacebuilding in Libya: Reality and Challenges First Online: 03 December 2025 You have full access to this open access chapter Governance without Government in the MENA Region Civil Society Organizations and Peacebuilding in Libya: Reality and Challenges Civil society organizations (CSOs) in Arab countries play a pivotal role in the peacebuilding process by fostering dialogue, promoting reconciliation, and addressing the root causes of conflict.

In societies fractured by political instability, sectarian divisions, and extremist violence, CSOs create safe spaces for community engagement and mediation between opposing groups. They work together to rebuild trust, advocate for inclusive policies, and support transitional justice initiatives that acknowledge past grievances and promote social cohesion.

Recently, growing academic attention has been paid to examining and analyzing this role, particularly in conflict zones and transitional contexts such as Yemen, Iraq, and Tunisia. However, additional studies are required for a better understanding of that role. This chapter scrutinizes the CSOs in Libya and their efforts to cope with authoritarianism and to address victimized groups’ concerns.

It explores how they address the legacies of authoritarianism, advocate for human rights, and promote transitional justice. By highlighting the complexities of civil society engagement in the country, the chapter identifies key achievements and explores the main challenges they face.

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International Organization Social Work and Community Development Civic Engagement and Human Rights Advocacy Libya, a country suffering from an unstable transition, has been a subject of debate by scholars and policymakers. The country is polarized between armed actors that have monopolized the country’s resources, while political actors have failed to constitute a government of national unity.

Since the early stages of the uprising, the competing armed groups succeeded in maintaining their grip over state resources (Lacher, 2021 ; Ntaka & Csicsmann, 2021 ; Raineri, 2019 ; Rizk, 2021 ).

These armed fragmentation and security atomization have not been only justified by the lack of political consensus and regional interference but also by the Qaddafi regime policies established to marginalize the army and to prevent a state coup against his reign (Droz-Vincent, 2020 ; Gaub, 2019 ).

Those dispersed military actors have deeply affected the political and security situation of the country as they embedded themselves into political life and the national fabric through tribal linkages and social services networking (Abouzzohour & Yousef, 2023 ).

Beside the absence of unified security structures, regional and international intervention, spread of extremism, the emergence of a complex war economy, and tribal disputes which are deeply linked to political alliances have hindered all attempts of political unity. A whole range of decrees and laws that have been issued since 2012 failed to reach a political consensus on how to organize the presidential elections.

The country is divided between the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU) and the Government of National Stability (GNS) based in the east. Political talks facilitated by the United Nations Mission to Libya (UNSMIL) failed to produce presidential and legislative elections that were planned in December 2021, and Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, the president of GNU, refused to hand over the power.

In response, in January 2022, the House of Representatives (HoR), based in the east, appointed Fathi Bashagha, who allied with Khalifa Hiftar from the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF), as the prime minister of the newly formed government, the GNS. Today, it is presided by Osama Hamad, but the political impasse continues and the country suffers a fragile stability.

Recently, the UNSMIL formed an Advisory Committee that will provide recommendations for resolving the contentious issues that have prevented the organization of national elections. However, the prospects of unification are very modest according to Rosemary Dicarlo statements, the head of UN Political and Peacebuilding Affairs.

On 19 February 2025, she affirmed in the UN Security Council that Libya has faced a deep political crisis that hinders all attempts for political unification and called for international support for a peaceful transition. The LAAF, or what is known as the Libyan National Army, has captured the resources of the eastern part and extended its control to the southern part of the country.

The management of the Derna natural disaster is an illustration of the LAAF’s influence and its position in the transitional process. While the western part of the country is secured by the GNU security force formed from the dispersed armed groups.

Besides the war economy that has been strengthened and rienforced by both parties during the past decade, a new tendency has been documented towards a process of politicization and professionalization to gain more political weight and legitimize their presence (Lacher, 2023 ).

The violent confrontations between the two camps decreased remarkably during the last two years, a fact that has been justified by the interviewees by reaching an implicit compromise to share the resources revenues. However, localized clashes and tensions persist, especially in the west of the country, but usually between rival armed groups within Tripoli and nearby areas—not necessarily between the LNA and the GNU.

Based on data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED, 2024 ), the rising competition between those local forces in the western part made Libya in 2024 a zone of worsening violence. Within this chaotic situation, an emerged activism of CSOs has been noticed and documented since the early stages of the uprising.

Local communities and diaspora activists have mobilized their resources and conducted various initiatives across the country in response to citizens’ demands and have contributed effectively to peacebuilding process. However, ethnographic and detailed research about bottom-up activism in Libya is modest, a fact that could be generated in other cases in the Arab region.

Indeed, some cases have been fairly discussed and examined, such as Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia, Morocco, Syria, and Yemen (Ali Elayah et al. , 2018 ; Comaty, 2019 ; Elayah et al. , 2023 ; Elayah & Verkoren, 2020 ; Marchetti, 2018 ; Natil, 2021 ; Natil et al.

, 2019 ). But other cases, such as Algeria, Libya, and Sudan, have been under-analyzed due to the difficulty of accessing the field, lack of data, security vulnerability, and political constraints.

Moreover, various published papers address mainly the role of international organizations and how diaspora communities have dealt with past legacies and contributed to the peace process with narrowed attention to the local approaches that have been promoted by local agents (Başer, 2019 ; Kennedy, 2022 ; Stokke & Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2019 , 2022 ; Tenove, 2019 ).

limited research projects examine the construction, fragmentation, and reconfiguration of the CSOs in those countries during the war and after peace accords, how the religious narrative has shaped the bottom-up activism, the extent to which the financial dependency on external donors affects the internal structure and the functioning of CSOs, and how they reframe their role in the peacebuilding process.

In order to fill this scientific gap, this chapter examines the role of CSOs in the peace process, particularly in post-Qaddafi Libya. It is a qualitative research that draws on a variety of resources, including digital surveys, seminars, colloquiums, international organizations reports mapping the main political developments in the country, and interviews with Libyan academics and activists who are involved in bottom-up activism.

The interviews were semi-structured and carried out in Tunisia during December 2022, March 2023, and October–November 2024. The chapter is divided into three sections focusing on bottom-up associations in the form of nonprofit organizations and volunteer associations. Trade unions are not included in this study.

The first part of the analysis maps the literature on civil society and peacebuilding in conflict zones and transitional contexts. Then, the chapter illuminates how the Qaddafi regime positioned CSOs: the legal frameworks organizing bottom-up associations and the CSO-regime nexus.

The third section addresses the role of CSOs after the overthrow of the dictatorship, particularly in functions that have been designed to diminish violence and strengthen social peace and national reconciliation. Finally, it discusses the main constraints and challenges activists confront in carrying out their functions aiming to strengthen social cohabitation and diminish violence in all its forms. 10.

2 Civil Society Organizations and Peacebuilding Civil society (CS) has often been perceived as separate from the state and distinct from the political sphere that includes political parties (Spurk, 2010 , p. 7).

It mentions associations and groups emerging during the transitional phase or during authoritarianism with the aim to strengthen peace, including voluntary organizations, women groups, youth groups, trade unions, and human rights organizations.

Civil society organizations (CSOs) have been identified as key stakeholders playing a crucial role in the peacebuilding process, an assumption that has been defended and supported by neoliberal model. There is an increasing body of works in conflict studies and transitional literature that have examined how this agent has been positioned in transitional societies.

This growing attention to investigate the role of CSOs has developed with the fall of the communist regime in Eastern Europe and the collapse of Apartheid in South Africa (Grosescu, 2007 ; Howard, 2003 ; Ignatieff & Gellner, 1995 ; Kligman, 1990 ; Woods, 1992 ) where CSOs have been seen as agents for democratization, empowering freedom of expression, and enforcing good governance.

But during the past decades, CSOs have gained additional visibility in peacebuilding and conflict research that has considered it as an important actor in the landscape of post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation. This visibility and interest have been confirmed by the widening commitment of CSOs in collapsed states and conflict zones (Van Tongeren et al. , 2005 ).

Scholarly accounts seek a better understanding of the role of these bottom-up agents, their approaches to mitigating violence, forms of collaboration, and legal framework. Accordingly, CSOs may engage in all levels of peacebuilding, from the top leadership to the grassroots activities.

In this regard, everal theories of peacebuilding have underlined the extent to which CSO initiatives can leverage peace efforts, reinforce communal trust, and accelerate social building which are vital for transition to sustainable peace (Lederach, 1997 ). CSO could participate actively in peace diplomacy by engaging leading activists. as official mediators in peace agreements (Paffenholz, 2010 ).

But, this is rare to happen particularly when the CSO is highly fragmented and politicized due to societal factionalism and absence of national consensus about peacebuilding strategies. A fact that has been confirmed and evidenced during the Arab uprisings. However, CSOs could contribute in the application of II track diplomacy.

In this case, and parallel to official negotiations, informal meetings and building trust initiatives could be conducted by CSOs in order to diminish the levels of polarization and provide a common ground for dialogue. Scholars advance various models of CSOs inclusion in this process: consultation, observer status, and inclusive commission.

Those efforts could be led by religious leaders, political figures, academics, and women activists who have enjoyed trust in the belligerent camps (Dayal, Christien, 2020 , Little, 2007 , Odak, 2021 ). Both Mozambique and Northern Ireland are illustrations that evidenced the role of religious actors in negotiation facilitation and enhancing constructive communication (Kelleher and Johnson, 2008 ).

Second, CSOs could frame and outline for the transitional phase through training, sharing expertise and consultancy, enhancing accountability and transparency during the elections, collaborating with external donors, and issuing reports about root causes of violence and key determinants that are significant for peacebuilding architecture (Paffenholz & Spurk, 2010 ).

Those tasks generally have been conducted by academics, well-trained activists, religious leaders, and leaders of human rights organizations. Finally, CSOs can contribute to the peace process through community mobilization that targets rebuilding the state-society relationship and enhancing the societal fabric.

This grassroots space is one of the main spheres where CSOs have succeeded in achieving remarkable efforts and conducting pioneering initiatives, particularly in societies that adopted top-down peace initiatives.

In this case, CSOs became an alternative service delivery supplier and a guarantor of basic victims’ rights such as humanitarian relief, education, women empowerment, psychological services for affected victim communities, and documentation. Indeed, CSOs in conflict zones and transitional settings have shown concerns with social justice, governance of humanitarian aid, and individual and communal reconciliation.

However, two points should be evoked when we address CSOs’ role in transitional settings and post-conflict societies. it is noteworthy to mention that the space and the effectiveness of CSOs depend on the context in which those organizations have operated.

Rather than embracing the old perception that portrays CSOs as a “good thing” and a peace-driving force, it is better to neutralize its role and understand it in the context within which it has acted.

Thania Paffenholz, for instance, maintained that the constructive role of the CSOs has been determined by plenty of factors, including state behavior, level of violence, freedom of expression, diversity within civil society, influence of external donors, and the role of donor engagement (Paffenholz et al. , 2010 ).

Thus, on one hand, the effectiveness of CSOs in post-conflict settings has been deeply determined by social, political, and economic contexts. On the other hand, it is affected by the internal structure and organization: its vulnerability to political and tribal divisions, approach of intervention, funding, external network, and linkages with diaspora activists.

Case studies research exploring the contribution of the CSOs in post-conflict societies has evidenced and maintained the variation of this impact. Moreover, liberal responses to conflicts and that put emphasize on the role of western model of peacebuilding in terms of the role of CSOs have faced numerous criticisms by either scholars or policymakers and activists (Lewis, 2010 ).

There is an urgent necessity to decolonize, democratize, and decentralize peacebuilding research and to reconsider peacebuilding localization. The post-Cold War peacebuilding architecture appeared to have faced a critical juncture in favor of local ownership seeking to promote new models for peacebuilding taking into consideration the local approaches for societal construction.

This criticism has been associated with a growing engagement of local associations and indigenous peace efforts in troubled zones, particularly in what was called contexts of authoritarian conflict management. Many conceptual debates affiliate to questions around what and where the “local” really is, its relation to the “international,” and what this local is independent have organized.

Transitional justice scholars, for instance, have progressively situated “locality” as a means to build a more effective regime that would guarantee victims’ rights and the rule of law (Kochanski, 2020 ; Manning et al. , 2023 ; Volčič & Simić, 2013 ). Initial interest has been directed to the role of CSOs that respond to past legacies and their resonance among the victimized communities by addressing various aspects.

Cases such as Rwanda, Cambodia, Argentina, Chili, Timor-Leste, and Guatemala are typical examples that illustrate this academic interest toward understanding localization of peace efforts (Boonpunth & Saheem, 2022 ; Cosgrove, 2010 ; Eschmann & Nilsson, 2023 ; Hoyos, 1980 ; Kent, 2020 ; Masabo, 2017 ; Shefik, 2018 ). 10. 2.

1 Civil Society Organizations During the Qaddafi Regime CSO’s functioning under authoritarianism is a controversial subject. While this last one was broadly portrayed as a democratization vehicle for many decades in the transition paradigm, recent research has directed to examine the variation of CSO activism in those contexts (Browers, 2006 ; Hinnebusch, 2006 ; Volpi, 2006 ).

The protest wave across the Arab countries that has called for political change and the countermovement against this political change attempt have led us to reconsider further the role of CSOs under authoritarianism and to understand the complexity of its reproduction and activism beyond neoliberal normative biases.

The deep fragmentation that has been recorded within the CSOs in Arab countries and diaspora activism has reflected that how the society is expressing itself has affected directly modes of civic engagement and, thus, the role of CSOs. Qaddafi Libya is a typical example to the limits of civic activism in authoritarian contexts and the significance of contextualizing this activism in its social and political framework.

The legal framework for CSOs in Libya was among the most restrictive in North Africa, effectively impeding the emergence of genuine structures that would promote a real democracy. Qaddafi rule imposed significant legal restrictions on the formation, independence, and funding of these associations. In September 10, 1970, law No.111 was issued addressing the main instructions to create what was called “nonprofit organizations.

” Based on the main articles, all the decisions and activities should be organized under the supervision of the Social Affairs Ministry. This law was followed by many decisions that were related to public liberties and freedom of speech. All of them were served to exercise control on bottom-up actions that would threaten Qaddafi rule.

The Act No. 45 of 1972 prohibited strikes and demonstrations, while Act No. 75 of 1973 nationalized independent newspapers and journals to control the printed media. These new legal frameworks resulted at the increasing opposition against Qaddafi system by who were mentioned as “Fatih revolution enemies”.

Broadly mobilizing a conspiracy account, the regime claimed that these opponents were recruited by foreign intelligence, threateninig the interest of Libyan people and launched a large repressive campaign against them. During the 1990s, and as a response to the failure of revolutionary inspiration, Qaddafi regime promoted new tribal politics to establish his grip on power, natural resources, and society.

Tribal cooptation policies became one of regime’s avenues to serve its political interests and prevent all attempts of a state coup, a thing that ultimately exacerbated the preexisting rivalries among Libyan tribes (Barmin, 2022 , p. 727). Unfortunately, the focal role that the tribe play in the constitution and reproduction of the Libyan society facilitated this cooptation policy and hindered the constitution of real CSOs.

This policy was intensified and emphasized after the American bombing raids on Tripoli and Benghazi in April 1986 and then the failed state coup in 1993 (Joffe, 2013 ; Obeidi, 2001 ). The regime provided economic and government positions for loyal tribesmen in the General Committees of People and security apparatus.

Also, bottom-up projects to sustain local communities were developed using those tribal connections and networks: privileged tribes were given a space to conduct certain economic and social projects in the form of associations (Aboueldahab, 2018 , pp. 193–194). Qaddafi maintained that these associations provided a social umbrella for people who were disadvantaged.

Thus, Libyan, according to him, did not need bottom-up organizations in the Western sense. In 2001, due to the international pressure, a new act was issued in favor of the constitution of CSOs: Law No. 19. Contradictory to his previous discourses, Qaddafi emphasized the importance of civil associations because they employed a significant number of people and provided social services.

The regime changed his “rupture account” to a more moderate narrative calling to draft new legal framework to organize civic activism in Libya. He ordered for the People’s Conferences to prepare a draft law that will organize their formation and functions (Salhi, 2015 , p. 116).

Nonetheless, few differences could be noticed between the past legal framework and the new one: the law No. 19 allowed to found associations, but it guaranteed the state oversight on them through securing the recruitment of clientelist representatives in different organs. Also, foreign funding was severely restricted; the approval of the national authorities was mandatory to receive external donations.

Article 14 of the law banned cooperation with organizations whose headquarters lay outside Libya, and all forms of collaboration with foreign donors outside the official legal frameworks were considered a national treason that could lead to death sentence (Aboueldahab, 2018 , p. 193). Activists affirm that registering a new association under law 19 during Qaddafi era could take up to two years, with no guarantee of obtaining a permit.

Associations had to be approved by the security apparatus and had to include government representatives among their executive boards. In addition, the new judicial framework privileged only associations that were directed to provide social and economic services (Salhi, 2015 , pp. 116–117).

In contrast, associations that seek to defend human rights were highly banned. These restrictions and the climate of fear that prevailed at that time largely dissuaded activists from seeking foreign financial support and from forming associations. A report of the Commission of Civil Society (CCS) issued in 2020 asserted that there were about 270 organizations distributed between various districts.

It comes in the first place: Tripoli, Benghazi, Derna, and Al- Bayda (Elmemadani, 2020a , 2020b ). Most of them conducted activities linked to tourism, African heritage, environment, and social services.

However, it is worthy to mention the remarkable efforts of human rights defenders to reveal the state atrocities against civilians at that time such as massacres of Abu Salim prison in 1996 (Human Right Watch, 2009 ), and which led to a visit carried out by the Human Rights Watch to Abu Salim prison in May 2005.

The Head of the agency Colonel Tohamy Khaled declared that the government opened an investigation, but did not provide information on the tools, agents, and timing of that initiative (Human Rights Watch, 2003 ). However, victims’ families continued their contests against the absence of truth and impunity culture.

Indeed, in Benghazi, they led protests with the support of human rights activists every Saturday since June 2008, in which they demanded the truth about the fate of their relatives (Human Rights Watch, 2009 ).

Salwa Bugaighis, a human rights lawyer, for instance, demonstrated continued efforts in order to defend victims who filed several “political cases against the state during Qaddafi” particularly requesting compensation for the detained (Aboueldahab, 2017 , pp. 86–88).

Among the main organizations that have been active in the field of human rights in Libya at that time was the Qaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation (GICDF) which was headed by Saif al-Islam Qaddafi who declared in Cairo in May 2010 that the GICDF was registered in 2003 in Switzerland, due to difficulties in obtaining registration in Libya.

While regime’s opponents largely assumed that GICDF was a means to support the regime and its policies, it is essential to acknowledge that the organization at least provided a sphere to examine critical issues (Joffe, 2013 ). Saif al-Islam Gaddafi’s reform program during Libya’s rapprochement with the west in the 2000s opened up a space for victims of state violence to seek accountability and redress (Kurze & Lamont, 2019 , p. 161).

He worked to impose new reforms, and the GICDF was the country’s only association that addressed complaints about torture, arbitrary detention, and disappearances (Bruce St. John, 2011 ). It called for more freedom of expression and association, looked into allegations of torture within Libya, and pursued several cases with the authorities.

The GICDF played a vital role in facilitating the Amnesty International’s visit to the country during February 2004 and May 2009 (Amnesty International, 2010 , p. 20) and in the organization of Human Rights Watch’ press conference in Tripoli in December 2009 (Bruce St. John, 2011 ).

Those initiatives led to the issue of its first human rights report in 2009 calling for reforms and a second report released in December 2010 denouncing restrictions against civil society and called for more media freedom.

However, Saif Islam Qaddaf’s efforts to promote the freedom of association and defend the creation of civil society organizations were constrained by the regime policies sought to restrain all attempts to strengthen the collective actions for addressing human rights concerns, particularly after the start of Tunisia uprisings. The leader Muammar Qaddafi announced publicly in January 2010 that there was no place for CSOs in Libya.

Furthermore, he suspended the newspapers and detained journalist who criticized corruption practices in the country (Bruce St. John, 2011 ; Joffe, 2010 ). In sum, pre-transition Libya was thus marked by a crippled civil society that was unable to effectively push for a better human rights situation and democratic reform without being brutally repressed by Qaddafi’s regime.

However, it is undeniable that this limited sphere of activism acted as a catalyst for mobilizing resistance against the dictatorship in the 2000s and for framing post-revolutionary justice demands.

Indeed, mass demonstrations denouncing the regime’ policies were sparked by the arrest of a human rights lawyer in Benghazi, Fathi Terbil, who represented the families of Islamist prisoners killed in Abu Salim prison (Kurze & Lamont, 2019 , p. 160). This protest movement was one of the triggers that precipitated the overthrow of long-standing dictatorship in North Africa.

10. 3 Civil Society Organizations and Peacebuilding After Qaddafi In the wake of the civil uprising in Libya that started in February 2011, CSOs have flourished and proliferated across the country in the form of volunteer groups (Clément & Salah, 2014 , p. 118).

Causes and motivations explaining “CSO boom” in the country are multiple such as the horizontal solidarity to overthrow the dictatorship, raising awareness among citizens about political situation, providing legal assistance, humanitarian relief, facilitating registration procedures, and the return of many diaspora activists to the country (Salhi, 2015 , pp. 247–250).

In the early days of the revolt, registration simply entailed submitting contact information to the Ministry of Social Affairs which explains the increase of bottom-up activism organizations (Mercy Corps & The Governance Network, 2011 , p. 7). In 2012, Libya recorded the highest number of CSOs that was estimated upon 1915 organizations (Elmemadani, 2020a , 2020b ).

They were remarkably supported by international organizations, external donors, and International Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) (UNDP, 2015 ). In 2012, for instance, the European Union funded the “Civil Initiative Libya” to strengthen the capacity of emerging Libyan CSOs that were founded to deliver services and to promote good governance (UNDP, 2015 , p. 8).

With the start of the uprising, the concept of CSOs was still quite new to the Libyan context. There was limited experience about how these organizations should work in chaotic contexts. Even analysts expressed their surprise at this “CSOs fever.

” However, the absence of the CSOs in its western form during Qaddafi era does not reflect necessarily a total absence of solidarity-based collective identities. Collective networks were reconfigured and reconstituted during the dictatorship based on multiple connections: tribe, neighborhood, and common victimization.

With the spread of contest movement across the country challenging the regime, these horizontal networks were mobilized, and civilians reacted spontaneously to provide economic and social assistance for vulnerable communities and affected zones.

Volunteering networks, for instance, were formed and expanded throughout the Eastern region; a part of them succeeded in organizing aid to the southern population in Kufra Oasis, as well as providing emergency relief to Misrata and Nafusa Mountains by sea (Clément & Salah, 2014 , p. 120). They addressed the dysfunction of the state institutions, responded to the needs and demands of the population, and supported the contest movement.

In areas where salaries were cut off and financial transfers stopped by Tripoli, people collected money to provide food and medical relief to what was called “Thuwar,” the families of the victims, and the vulnerable segments (Clément & Salah, 2014 , p. 120).

As an effort to organize civil society organizations, the Libyan transition government under Abderahim Alkeib issued a decree to create the center to support civil society organizations, which become in 2018 the Commission of Civil Society (CCS).

Many volunteer groups and charities evolved later into more structured entities, especially that include experts from diaspora communities who have considerable experience in human rights militancy and benefited from professional training abroad. However, the prevalence of violence and the start of civil war caused a decrease in those activism forms and negatively affected the CSO activities.

During 2014 and 2015, the number of CSOs decreased remarkably due to tribal polarization, lack of funding, situation of insecurity and political uncertainty, societal fragmentation, and the spread of extremism (Altai Consulting, 2015). The CCS report of 2020 affirmed that CSOs between 2011 and 2018 reached 5415 addressing a variety of Libyan citizen’ concerns mostly concentrated in Tripoli and Benghazi.

But, most of them address social services, economic concerns, scientific innovation, and culture. A limited number of newly created associations have examined and involved efficiently in political reform: 12 organizations of national reconciliation, 54 organizations examine democratic reform and electoral process, and 497 focus on legal reform and human rights (Elmadani, 2020b ). 10.

3. 1 Mediation, Peace Training, and Humanitarian Relief The failure of the transitional government to demobilize armed groups and the escalation of violence resulting from the crisis of 2014 directed further the attention of CSOs in Libya towards security and peacebuilding tasks.

Stopping violence, mediation, enabling peacebuilding capacities, and local reconciliation have been prioritized in the grassroots agenda as prerequisites for democratic transition.

The role of CSOs in mediation process and political negotiation that targets to achieve a national reconciliation is limited and broadly narrowed to a consultative role due to political divergences, security dynamics, the dominance of tribal loyalties, and militarization of the society. This marginalization from the peace agreements is a generalized act that has affected all the countries in the region, such as Algeria and Lebanon.

Indeed, the bottom-up activism failed to promote joint actions that would enhance collaboration between eastern and western authorities in the country. It is undeniable that CCS integrated CSOs under its institutional umbrella; nevertheless, collaboration has been limited to the organization of debate platforms, seminars, and conferences.

Asma Khalifa, a human rights activist, described the total absence of local CSOs representatives in the main peace talks: “It is pointless to organize roundtables and workshops by international actors to train youth on mediation and reconciliation skills, while the main peace agreements have excluded and marginalized them” (LEFPD, 2023 ).

CSOs representatives are only involved as consultants with United Nation Support Mission in Libya UNSMIL: they work together to develop a new agenda directed to discuss the reform of the